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I. INTRODUCTION
The law is not static. It must keep pace with changes in our society, for the doctrine of stare decisis is not an iron mold which can
never be changed. . . . It may be argued that any change in this
rule should come from the legislature . . . . Legislative action could,
of course, be taken, but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule.1

The doctrine of necessaries is a common-law doctrine first
adopted by the Florida courts in 1895.2 The doctrine, which originated in English courts more than three hundred years ago, 3 held a
husband liable to third parties for any necessaries the third party
* The author thanks Diane K. McClellan for providing the inspiration for this
Comment.
1. Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1971).
2. See Phillips v. Sanchez, 35 Fla. 187, 17 So. 363 (1895).
3. See Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 1767
(1984) [hereinafter Unnecessary Doctrine].
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provided to his wife.4 At common law, a woman’s legal identity
merged with that of her husband; she could not own property, enter
into contracts, or receive credit as an individual. 5 This condition,
known as coverture, created a need for the doctrine of necessaries
because a married woman was dependent upon her husband for
maintenance and support. By prohibiting women from obtaining
necessaries, the law forced women to look to the bounty of their husbands for food, shelter, clothing, and medical services. 6
In 1943, the Florida Legislature abrogated coverture,7 yet the necessaries doctrine remained. As late as December 1995, a husband remained liable for the necessaries incurred by his wife. 8 However, the
longstanding common-law doctrine created issues of equal protection
because women had no similar liability for their husbands’ debts.9
The Florida Supreme Court recognized the need to either abolish
the doctrine or extend liability to both spouses in Shands Teaching
Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith.10 Despite this recognition, the court
refused to decide the issue, imploring the Legislature to resolve the
question.11 In December 1995, the court faced the issue once again in
Connor v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc.12 The
court, believing a lack of consensus existed among the states employing the doctrine, decided to abolish the doctrine, leaving the
Legislature to codify the doctrine if it wished. 13 In dissent, Justice
Ben Overton suggested that the judiciary was too quick to pass responsibility to the Legislature.14 He believed the court’s decision was
actually in the minority, and that the doctrine should be modified to
afford primary and secondary liability.15 As it stands, the doctrine
remains uncodified by the Florida Legislature. Two bills proposing
joint and several liability between spouses were introduced during
the 1996 Regular Session, but died in committee. 16
4. See id.; see also Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 668 So. 2d 175,
175 (Fla. 1995).
5. See Connor, 668 So. 2d at 175.
6. See id.
7. See Act effective June 4, 1943, ch. 21932, 1943 Fla. Laws 484; see also FLA. STAT.
§ 708.08 (1995) (stating that a married woman has the right, without the joinder of her
husband, to contract and be contracted with as though she were unmarried).
8. See Connor, 668 So. 2d at 179.
9. See id. at 176; Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So. 2d 199, 202
(Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that, without a reciprocal duty, the doctrine of necessaries
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
10. 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
11. See id. at 646.
12. 668 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1995).
13. See id. at 177.
14. See id. at 177-79 (Overton, J., dissenting).
15. See id.
16. See Fla. HB 1211 (1996); Fla. SB 906 (1996); see also FLA. LEGIS., FINAL
LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 320,
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Part II of this Comment examines the history of the necessaries
doctrine in Florida and provides an overview of the court’s Connor
decision. Part III explores the decisions of other states addressing
the necessaries issue. In addition, Part III discusses the options that
legislatures may consider and the need for any of these options in
today’s society. Finally, Part IV concludes that the Florida Legislature should not codify any form of the necessaries doctrine.
II. CONNOR AND THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
A. Cases Addressing the Doctrine
The doctrine of necessaries was originally adopted in Florida over
a hundred years ago in Phillips v. Sanchez.17 Ironically, Mr. Phillips
was the spouse in need of medical care.18 For the last two years of his
life, he was an almost entirely blind invalid suffering from a skin
disease.19 Mrs. Phillips kept boarders in their home and could not
care for her husband by herself due to the responsibilities of managing the household.20 She therefore retained the services of her sister to assist in Mr. Phillips’ care.21 Finding that Mrs. Phillips had
authority to act as the agent of her husband, the court stated:
As a general proposition, the wife has no authority to bind the
husband by contract unless she is his agent in fact. This well
known exception to this general rule is an incident to her right of
support from her husband, and she is, for that purpose, his agent,
and can bind him to pay for such things as are necessary for the
proper maintenance of herself and family. Domestic service in accordance with the means of the husband and social station of the
family is a necessity.22

Thus, Mr. Phillips, through his estate, was required to pay. Significantly, the court found Mr. Phillips’ medical care a necessity for his
wife.23
HB 1211; FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 94, SB 906.
At the time this Comment was being prepared for publication, a bill that would impose
joint and several liability for hospital bills on husbands and wives living together was
pending in the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. See
Fla. CS for HB 349, § 12 (1997) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 395.301(7)).
17. 35 Fla. 187, 17 So. 363 (1895). For a more complete discussion of the history of
the doctrine of necessaries in Florida, see Mary Elizabeth Borja, Functions of Womanhood: The Doctrine of Necessaries in Florida, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397 (1992).
18. See Phillips, 35 Fla. at 190, 17 So. at 364.
19. See id., 17 So. at 364.
20. See id., 17 So. at 364.
21. Id. at 191, 17 So. at 364.
22. Id., 17 So. at 364.
23. See id. at 192, 17 So. at 364. In his dissent in Connor, Justice Overton found
irony in the fact that the dispute in Phillips focused on necessary medical services for the
husband: “Interestingly, the case in which we established the doctrine involved circum-
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Eighty-five years later, and thirty-seven years after the Florida
Legislature abrogated coverture, a Florida court addressed for the
first time the question of whether the doctrine resulted in a wife’s liability for the necessary expenses of her husband. In Manatee Convalescent Center v. McDonald,24 the Second District Court of Appeal
extended the doctrine, holding the wife liable for medical expenses
incurred by her deceased husband.25 The court looked to actions of
the Florida Legislature, which had adopted a reciprocal and complementary burden of support between spouses. 26 For example, in
1971, the Florida Legislature changed all references to “husband”
and “wife” in the divorce laws, chapter 61, Florida Statutes, to
“spouse” or “party.”27 Additionally, the Legislature amended section
61.08, Florida Statutes, to allow alimony for either spouse.28 In light
of these changes, the McDonald court found that a modification of
the doctrine was appropriate.29 The Third District Court of Appeal
reached a similar decision soon after in Parkway General Hospital,
Inc. v. Stern.30
In 1986, the matter finally reached the Florida Supreme Court in
Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith.31 The court in
Shands rejected McDonald and Stern, holding that the decision to
abrogate the doctrine of necessaries was best left to the Legislature.32 The court agreed that it was an anachronism to hold the husband liable for a wife’s debts without holding a wife similarly responsible and found merit in the arguments of both the hospital and
the wife.33 The hospital argued that the marital partnership benefits
when one spouse receives medical services. 34 These benefits, the hospital asserted, gave rise to an implied-in-law contract, and thus the
other spouse should be liable to prevent unjust enrichment. 35 However, the wife denied that she had received any benefit or unjust enrichment from her husband’s medical services. 36 She argued that the
hospital should have sought her guaranty of the medical bills before
stances where the wife, acting as an agent for the husband, incurred obligations for the
care of her invalid husband and the claim was against his estate.” 668 So. 2d at 179 (Overton, J., dissenting).
24. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
25. See id. at 1359.
26. See id. at 1357.
27. See id.; see also Act effective June 22, 1971, ch. 71-241, 1971 Fla. Laws 1319.
28. See McDonald, 392 So. 2d at 1357; see also ch. 71-241, § 10, 1971 Fla. Laws at
1323.
29. See 392 So. 2d at 1357.
30. 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
31. 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
32. See id. at 646.
33. See id. at 645.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.

1997]

NECESSARIES DOCTRINE

1035

they rendered services and sought payment from the assets of her
deceased husband’s estate.37
The Florida Supreme Court hesitated to create a fixed rule of law
because it could “easily visualize instances where it would be inequitable to hold either a wife or a husband liable for medical services rendered to a spouse, just as we can visualize instances where it would be
inequitable not to hold either spouse liable for medical services received by the other spouse.”38 As such, the Shands decision focused on
the court’s desire and authority to modify a common-law rule.39
Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Shands did
not address the underlying equal protection issue created by the doctrine. Instead, the court held that the hospital as petitioner did not
have standing to make an equal protection argument. 40 By refusing
to decide, the court essentially left the issue open for the district
courts of appeal.
Two years after Shands, the equal protection issue came before
the Second District Court of Appeal in Webb v. Hillsborough County
Hospital Authority.41 A husband, who did not contract for medical
services provided to his wife, argued that he should not be liable for
the debt because such liability would violate his right to equal protection under the Florida and federal constitutions. 42 The court
agreed that a one-sided application of the necessaries doctrine resulted in an equal protection violation and relied on McDonald and
Stern to conclude that the doctrine should be extended. 43 The Shands
decision did not deter the Second District Court from extending the
doctrine. Instead, the court concluded that the Florida Supreme
Court’s disapproval of McDonald and Stern was based on the hospitals’ lack of standing to make equal protection claims. 44 With the
37. See id. at 646.
38. Id.
39. The court called the situation a “decisional quandary,” id., and explained why it
was hesitant to change the longstanding rule. The court stated that the issue had such
broad social implications that its resolution required input from the public in general and
that the judiciary was the branch of government least capable of receiving this input. See
id. As such, the court looked to Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971), and Zorzos v.
Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985), to determine what it believed to be the controlling question: whether the court was the proper institution to resolve the issue. In Gates, the court
expanded the common-law right of consortium to allow wives a cause of action. See 247
So. 2d at 45. In contrast, the Zorzos court declined to create a common-law right to sue for
parental consortium when the parent does not die, leaving the Legislature to make any
change in the law. See 467 So. 2d at 307. Unlike the parties in Gates, the parties in
Shands did not raise a valid equal protection argument. Therefore, the court distinguished the case and followed Zorzos. See Shands, 497 So. 2d at 646.
40. See Shands, 497 So. 2d at 646 n.1.
41. 521 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
42. See id. at 200.
43. See id. at 203.
44. See id.
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husband bringing suit in this case, no such standing issue existed. 45
Therefore, the court chose to extend the doctrine with one limitation:
“For purposes of pleading and proof by a creditor, a showing that the
spouse to whom necessaries were provided is unable to pay . . . shall
be a condition precedent to the liability of the other spouse for the
necessaries.”46 Despite the supreme court’s call to the Legislature in
Shands, the Webb court believed it had discretion to modify the rule:
[I]f a court failed to make such a choice, followed existing commonlaw by affirming a final judgment . . . which held a husband responsible for necessaries provided to his wife, left law as is that a
wife is not reciprocally responsible, and simply announced that the
choice of law is for the legislature to make, the constitutional equal
protection violation would have been ignored, which a court is not
entitled to do. Thus, it appears inevitable that there be a courtmade choice of law in order not to ignore the equal protection violation.47

Webb, however, did not end the controversy surrounding the necessaries doctrine. In Heinemann v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital48 and Faulk v. Palm Beach Gardens Community Hospital,
Inc.,49 the Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the Webb
court and held that a wife was not liable for the necessary expenses
incurred by her husband.50 The Fifth District Court of Appeal also
rendered a decision in direct conflict with Webb. In Waite v. Leesburg
Regional Medical Center, Inc.,51 the court simply disregarded Webb
and held that an unmodified necessaries doctrine violated neither
the federal Equal Protection Clause nor its state counterpart. 52
B. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision in Connor
Kenneth Connor incurred medical expenses in 1992 for services
provided to him by Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center. 53
Connor was unable to pay an $85,000 outstanding balance owed to
Southwest.54 In 1993, Southwest sued Connor and his wife for the
debt, claiming a written agreement obligated the Connors to pay. 55
Mrs. Connor moved to dismiss Southwest’s complaint against her
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 207.
48. 585 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
49. 598 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
50. See Heinemann, 585 So. 2d at 1162; Faulk, 589 So. 2d at 1029.
51. 582 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
52. See id. at 790.
53. See Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 643 So. 2d 681, 681 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1994).
54. See id.at 682.
55. See id.
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because she had not executed any agreement to pay for the services
provided to her husband.56
The trial court followed an unmodified doctrine of necessaries as
it believed existed under Shands and disregarded the Webb court’s
expansion of the doctrine.57 As a result, the court dismissed the
claim.58 Subsequently, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed
and remanded the case, recognizing that the doctrine of necessaries
in Florida was “muddied” and certifying the case to the Florida Supreme Court as being in conflict with four cases in other districts. 59
1. The Majority Opinion
The supreme court began its opinion by discussing the history of
the doctrine, highlighting McDonald, Shands, and Webb, as well as
the four cases that directly disagreed with or ignored Webb.60 Although Connor was before the court in the same posture as Shands,
the conflict in the district courts over the abrogation or extension of
the doctrine forced the court to address the equal protection issue it
had left unresolved in Shands.61
Mrs. Connor argued that the doctrine of necessaries could no
longer be justified because women could contract freely for their own
necessaries.62 The hospital argued that although the original purpose
behind the doctrine no longer existed, the continuance of the doctrine served an important function by promoting the partnership
theory of marriage.63 The hospital contended that the doctrine should
therefore be extended to create liability for both men and women to
the third-party creditors of their spouses.64
In justifying its decision to abrogate the doctrine, the court looked
to the lack of consensus among other states confronting the issue.
First, the court cited three cases that abrogated the doctrine entirely
and gave the state legislature the choice whether to enact a version
of the doctrine into law.65 It went on to cite six cases that extended
the doctrine’s application to both sexes.66
56. See id.
57. See id. at 682.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 684.
60. See Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 668 So. 2d 175, 175 (Fla.
1995).
61. See id. at 176.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. (citing Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983); Condore v. Prince George’s
County, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981)).
66. See id. (citing Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994); Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1993); St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
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In addition, the court observed that the legislatures of four
states—Oklahoma, Kentucky, Georgia, and North Dakota—had enacted laws dealing with the doctrine.67 Both Oklahoma and Kentucky
had codified the doctrine in its original common-law form. 68 Georgia
had abolished the doctrine in 1979,69 and North Dakota had imposed
joint and several liability for debts incurred by either spouse for food,
clothing, fuel, and shelter.70 The North Dakota statute, however,
does not require a spouse to contribute to the other spouse’s medical
expenses.71
Thus, the court believed its refusal to modify the common law in
Shands was reinforced by the lack of consensus among other state
courts and legislatures.72 Similarly, the court concluded that its refusal to hold a wife liable for her husband’s necessaries was correct
in light of the Florida Legislature’s inaction since Shands.73 In turn,
equal protection concerns demanded that the court refuse to hold a
husband liable for his wife’s necessaries as well. 74 By abrogating the
doctrine, the court claimed it was actually refraining from making a
policy decision better left to the Legislature. 75
2. Justice Overton’s Dissent
In dissent, Justice Overton expressed dismay with the reasoning
behind the court’s decision to abrogate.76 While the majority relied on
the lack of consensus among other states to justify its position on the
doctrine, Justice Overton emphasized that the court’s decision to abrogate was actually in the minority.77
Justice Overton agreed that the doctrine, in its present state,
violated the Equal Protection Clause.78 Nevertheless, he felt that the
doctrine “is just as important today, under the partnership theory of
marriage, as it was when the doctrine was created under the unity
theory of marriage.”79 According to Justice Overton, abrogation
Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123 (Kan. 1992); North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris,
354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987); Richland Mem’l Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. 1984);
Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980)).
67. See id. at 177.
68. See id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 209 (1994)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 404.040
(Banks-Baldwin 1994)).
69. See id. (citing 1979 Ga. Laws 466, 491).
70. See id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-08 (1993)).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 179.
78. See id. at 177.
79. Id.
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“weaken[s] the obligations of marriage by eliminating the spousal
duty to care for one another,” “shift[s] the policy of this state by, in
effect, requiring each spouse to take care of himself or herself,” and
“reduces the legal obligations of the marriage contract.” 80
Justice Overton reasoned that the Legislature’s inaction implied
agreement with the judicially created policy surrounding the common-law doctrine of necessaries as it existed before Connor.81 Further, he asserted that it was within the court’s discretion to decide
the merits of the case because the incorporation of the doctrine into
Florida’s common law was originally a matter of judicial policy. 82 Interestingly, Justice Overton disagreed with the majority’s opinion
that a lack of consensus existed among the states. 83 To support this
assertion, Justice Overton tallied the number of cases addressing the
doctrine and considered their outcomes. 84
In his survey of these cases, Justice Overton discussed the options
exercised by various courts. Twelve states had extended the doctrine
in one of the following three ways: (1) by imposing joint and several
liability;85 (2) by imposing primary liability on the spouse who incurred the debt and secondary liability on the other spouse; 86 or (3)
by imposing primary liability on the husband and secondary liability
on the wife.87 Four states had abrogated the doctrine entirely, 88 and
two had simply reaffirmed the common-law doctrine without addressing the equal protection concerns.89
Further, Justice Overton argued that Florida had moved to a partnership theory of marriage, and that the doctrine was just as applicable today as it was in 1895: “[I]n many households, both spouses are
employed but only one spouse provides the medical coverage for the
entire household. Under these circumstances, the extension of the

80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 177-78.
83. See id. at 178.
84. See id.
85. See id. (citing North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C.
1987)).
86. See id. (citing Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. 1983)).
Justice Overton incorrectly cited South Carolina as being under this category. See id.; see
also Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12, 13-14 (S.C. 1984) (stating that the
necessaries doctrine allows third parties providing necessaries to a husband or wife to
bring an action against the other spouse).
87. See id. (citing Ohio State Univ. v. Kinkaid, 549 N.E.2d 517 (Ohio 1990) (noting
that the Ohio Legislature extended the doctrine to both parties)).
88. See id. (citing Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992); Condore v. Prince
George’s County, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981); Govan v. Medical Credit Servs., Inc., 621 So.
2d 928 (Miss. 1993); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va.
1983)).
89. See id. (citing Hitchcock Clinic, Inc. v. Mackie, 648 A.2d 817, 819 (Vt. 1993);
Medlock v. Fort Smith Serv. Fin. Corp., 803 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Ark. 1991)).
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doctrine fits like a glove by requiring the more able spouse to care for
the needs of the household.”90 Justice Overton stated that each
spouse is entitled to share in the fruits of the marital partnership
and cited two cases, Canakaris v. Canakaris91 and Thompson v.
Thompson,92 as involving the equitable distribution principles recognized by Florida.93 Canakaris held that spouses are considered partners for purposes of equitable distribution of marital assets upon divorce,94 while Thompson held that professional goodwill obtained after the formation of the marriage partnership was a partnership asset.95
Finally, Justice Overton cited Via v. Putnam96 as an illustration of
the court’s commitment to spousal support. Putnam was a probate
case and did not address the doctrine of necessaries. 97 However, Justice Overton quoted the Putnam court for the proposition, “The institution of marriage has been a cornerstone of western civilization for
thousands of years and is the most important type of contract ever
formed.”98
III. THE CONSENSUS OF THE STATES
A. Joint and Several Liability
1. Judicial Implementation of Joint and Several Liability
The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized joint and several
liability as a viable solution to an outdated necessaries doctrine in
North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris.99 In Harris, the
hospital filed suit against both Mr. and Mrs. Harris to collect approximately $3000 for medical expenses incurred by Mr. Harris. 100
Mrs. Harris specifically refused to sign as guarantor at the time of
her husband’s admission to the hospital. 101 When the hospital business office gave her the form authorizing treatment for Mr. Harris,
she signed it in her husband’s name and noted that the signature
was signed by her hand.102 While the lower court granted summary
90. Id. at 179.
91. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
92. 576 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1991).
93. See Connor, 688 So. 2d at 179.
94. See 382 So. 2d at 1203-04.
95. See 576 So. 2d at 268.
96. 656 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1995).
97. See Connor, 688 So. 2d at 179.
98. Id. (quoting Putnam, 656 So. 2d at 465 (quoting in turn In re Estate of Yohn, 238
So. 2d 290, 296 (Fla. 1970))).
99. 354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987).
100. See id. at 471.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 472.

1997]

NECESSARIES DOCTRINE

1041

judgment against Mr. Harris, it refused to hold Mrs. Harris liable,
dismissing the complaint.103 The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, found Mrs. Harris liable for the debt in its entirety, holding
that a wife may be held responsible for the necessary medical expenses of her husband, even in the absence of an express undertaking on her part.104
The Harris court’s analysis focused primarily on the state’s trend
toward gender neutrality and the need for neutrality in the application of the doctrine.105 Although Mrs. Harris argued that abrogation
of the doctrine would achieve this objective, the court reasoned that
a reciprocal duty for both spouses would serve several beneficial
ends.106 The court observed that the doctrine had historically encouraged health care providers and facilities to provide needed medical
services to married persons.107 According to the court, the doctrine
also recognized that marriage involved shared wealth, expenses, duties, and rights.108 To allow for spousal liability, the court opined,
would be to recognize “a personal duty of each spouse to support the
other, a duty arising from the marital relationship itself and carrying with it the corollary right to support from the other spouse.” 109
The court thus adopted joint and several liability, but did not elaborate on its decision to invoke that method as opposed to primary and
secondary liability.
In Kilbourne v. Hanzelik,110 the Tennessee Supreme Court also
found that the necessaries doctrine applied to both sexes. However,
the facts of Kilbourne differ from those of Harris or any of the Florida cases discussed above. The Kilbourne court based its decision to
extend the doctrine on the since-overruled Manatee Convalescent
Center, Inc. v. McDonald.111 In Kilbourne, the group medical insurance of the appellant, Linda Kilbourne, paid $50,000 in medical expenses incurred by her husband after a car accident in which the
other driver was killed.112 She subsequently filed suit against the
administrator of the deceased driver’s estate to recover those expenses.113 The trial court granted summary judgment against Mrs.
Kilbourne based on common-law rules that did not obligate a wife to

103. See id. at 471-72
104. See id. at 475.
105. See id. at 473.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 474.
110. See Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tenn. 1983).
111. See id. at 932; Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356
(Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
112. See Kilbourne, 648 S.W.2d at 932.
113. See id.
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pay for her husband’s necessaries and that denied her a right to recover for necessaries that were in fact paid by her. 114 The court of appeals affirmed the decision, but the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded, noting the existence of amended
alimony statutes that established a gender-neutral burden of support in both Florida and Tennessee.115 The supreme court adopted
the reasoning in McDonald, thereby allowing Mrs. Kilbourne a cause
of action to recover the money she, or in actuality, her insurance
company, paid.116
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harbison stated that several issues raised by the estate administrator were still open. 117 A factual
dispute existed as to whether Mrs. Kilbourne and her husband were
separated at the time of the accident.118 Justice Harbison noted that
a duty to furnish necessaries to a spouse living apart is different
from that of spouses living together.119
2. Legislative Implementation of Joint and Several Liability
A number of states currently have family expense statutes and
statutes that expressly codified an expanded doctrine implementing
joint and several liability.120 Florida legislators introduced bills in
the 1996 Regular Session aimed at doing the same. 121 Both bills
failed, dying in committee before reaching the floor. 122 Their introduction, however, illustrates the future of the doctrine in Florida and
the direction the Legislature may take in codifying an expanded doctrine. Florida House Bill 1211 and Florida Senate Bill 906 both
stated: “The husband and wife are liable jointly and severally for any
debts contracted by either, while living together, for necessary
household supplies of food, clothing, and fuel, for medical care, and
for shelter for themselves and family, and for the education of their
minor children.”123 Unlike the Virginia, Montana, and Hawaii stat114. See id.
115. See id. at 932.
116. See id. at 933.
117. See id. at 934 (Harbison, J., concurring).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (1996); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-24 (Michie 1995); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/15 (West 1996);
MINN. STAT. § 519.05 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§25-2-11 (Michie 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.16.205 (1995).
121. See Fla. HB 1211 (1996); Fla. SB 906 (1996).
122. See FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 320, HB 1211; FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL
INFORMATION, 1996 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 94, SB 906.
123. Fla. HB 1211 § 1 (1996); Fla. SB 906 § 1 (1996). Interestingly, the bill pending before the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services as this Com-
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utes, which simply create spousal liability for “necessaries,” 124 the
Florida bills specifically listed the covered expenses. North Dakota,
on the other hand, imposes joint and several liability for food, clothing, fuel, and shelter, but does not include medical expenses. 125 This
exclusion is a significant difference because most of the modern
cases dealing with the doctrine of necessaries focus on medical
costs.126
3. Joint and Several Liability as a Creditor’s Tool
Recognizing that most doctrine-of-necessaries cases today do not
involve a neglectful spouse who refuses to provide food, shelter, and
clothing to the other spouse, it becomes apparent that the doctrine
owes its continued existence to its use as a collection device for creditors. In the last fifty years, all of the Florida cases in which a party
invoked the doctrine involved unpaid medical expenses. 127 In case after case, hospitals sought to trap an unwilling spouse into making
payment on a debt for which he or she did not contract. 128
ment was being prepared for publication would impose joint and several liability only for
hospital bills. See Fla. CS for HB 349, § 12 (1997) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 395.301(7))
(“Hospital bills are considered family expenses in which the husband and wife, while living together, are jointly and severally liable for each other and their minor children.”).
124. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-24 (Michie 1995):
Both spouses of a marriage, whether married in this State or in some other
jurisdiction, and residing in this, shall be bound to maintain, provide for, and
support one another during marriage, and shall be liable for all debts contracted by one another for necessaries for themselves, one another, or their
family during marriage . . . .
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1995):
Neither husband nor wife, as such, is answerable for the acts of the other or
liable for the debts contracted by the other; provided, however, that the expenses for necessaries of the family and of the education of the children are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and
in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately.
See also VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1995):
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a spouse shall not be responsible for the other spouse’s contract or tort liability to a third party, whether
such liability arose before or after the marriage. The doctrine of necessaries as
it existed at common-law shall apply equally to both spouses, except where
they are permanently living separate and apart, but shall in no event create
any liability between such spouses as to each other . . . .
125. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-08 (1995).
126. See Borja, supra note 17, at 423 n.162; Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at
1784; see also generally Alan P. Woodruff & Arthur H. Lester, Claims for Medical Expenses Under the Doctrine of Necessaries,FLA. B.J., Dec. 1993, at 30.
127. See Borja, supra note 17, at 423 n.162.
128. See, e.g., Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 668 So. 2d 175 (Fla.
1995); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem’l Hosp., 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983); Jersey Shore
Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980); Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The spouses in these cases
were unwilling to pay for the debts of their living spouses. A spouse who refuses to pay
when the estate of the deceased spouse is either insufficient to cover the debt or not subject to probate is another factual scenario prevalent in doctrine-of-necessaries cases. See,
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A doctrine providing for joint and several liability allows a hospital or other creditor unfettered discretion in the collection of a debt
because those creditors may seek payment from either spouse, regardless of which spouse actually incurred the debt. 129 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that such an extension of the doctrine
treats spouses equally, but characterized the rule as “equality with a
vengeance.”130 The court stated:
The rule would result in the immediate exposure of the property of
one spouse for a debt incurred by the other spouse. A creditor
would receive the same benefits as if both spouses had agreed to
joint liability. Neither equity nor reality justifies imposing unqualified liability on one spouse for the debts of the other or exempting one spouse from liability for the necessary expenses of the
other.131

The entire purpose of the original necessaries doctrine—to provide
for a spouse who cannot provide for her or himself—is further undermined because joint and several liability allows a creditor to proceed against a nondebtor spouse regardless of whether the financial
resources of the debtor spouse are sufficient to cover the debt. 132 In
other words, the doctrine, touted as a device that encourages marital
care and support, is reduced to a creditor’s remedy. 133
4. Spouses Living Apart
Some state laws recognize that a support duty may not exist if
spouses are not living together.134 The recent Florida bills and the
Virginia statute state this exception;135 other states’ statutes do not
expressly make a distinction, but rather clarify it through case
law.136 Without this distinction, a spouse who is not living with the
debtor at the time the debt is incurred and who awaits final dissolution of the marriage could be liable for the debt.
e.g., Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982); Condore v. Prince George’s County, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md.
1981); Heinemann v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 585 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
129. See Marcus L. Moxley, North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris: North Carolina Adopts a Gender-Neutral Approach to the Doctrine of Necessaries, 66 N.C. L. REV.
1241, 1246-47 (1987).
130. Baum, 417 A.2d at 1009.
131. Id.
132. See Moxley, supra note 129, at 1250-51.
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 19.05 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-2-11 (Michie 1996);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1995).
135. Fla. HB 1211 (1996); Fla. SB 906 (1996).
136. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1995); O’Brien v. Galley-Stockton Shoe Co., 173
P. 544, 544 (Colo. 1918) (holding that the statute making a husband and wife jointly liable
for family expenses does not apply where the husband and wife have separated and are
living apart).
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In Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,137 the Supreme Court of
Indiana held that the duty of spousal support continues until the
marital relationship is dissolved.138 Finding irrelevant an Indiana
statute allowing equitable distribution to take place at the date of final separation, the court cited a case that held that an estranged
spouse may look to the other spouse for support pending the date of
final dissolution.139 Due to a lack of precedent that might suggest
spousal support could be terminated prior to divorce, the court held
that Mrs. Bartrom was liable for expenses incurred by her husband
after the couple filed for divorce, but before the final dissolution. 140
The inequity of such a situation was recognized by the sponsors of
the Florida bills.141
B. Primary Liability on the Spouse Who Incurred the Debt
Other courts have elected to extend the necessaries doctrine to
both spouses by imposing primary liability on the spouse who incurred the debt and secondary liability on the other. 142 As discussed
above, the New Jersey Supreme Court found joint and several liability an inequitable solution because it gave the same rights to a creditor who contracted with one spouse as it gave to a creditor who held
an agreement with both.143 Nevertheless, the court recognized marriage as a “shared enterprise [and] a joint undertaking” that is “akin
to a partnership.”144 As a result, the court held that a creditor who
provides necessaries to one spouse can assume that the financial resources of both spouses may be used for payment; however, one
spouse may only become liable for the debt when the resources of the
other spouse who incurred the debt are insufficient. 145 The court justified its position by stating, “Marshaling the marital resources in
that manner grants some protection to a spouse who has not expressly consented to that debt.”146 Relying on the partnership theory
of marriage, the court chose an alternative somewhat less extreme
than either joint and several liability or abrogation. 147
137. 618 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1993).
138. See id. at 9.
139. See id. at 8 (citing Welling v. Welling, 272 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 1971)).
140. See id.
141. Fla. HB 1211 § 1 (1996); Fla. SB 906 § 1 (1996).
142. See Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148 (R.I. 1994); Bartrom,
618 N.E.2d at 8; St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Kan.
1992); Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J.
1980).
143. See Baum, 417 A.2d at 1009.
144. Id. at 1010.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
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C. Marriage as Partnership
In Connor, Justice Overton stressed the importance of the partnership theory of marriage.148 He stated that under the partnership
theory, each spouse is entitled to share in the financial fruits of the
marriage, a concept he believed Florida recognized in its equitable
principles of distribution.149 As Justice Overton suggested, the
shared financial success or failure of a couple is an important aspect
of marriage.150 Nevertheless, marriages and business partnerships
are not sufficiently analogous; the ultimate goal of marriage is not
financial enterprise and profit.151 Significantly, the cases mentioned
in Justice Overton’s dissent involved dissolution of marriage and allowed for a case-by-case determination of how much each spouse contributed to the marriage and how much each might take away. 152
These cases suggest that the law must step into the boundaries of
the marriage institution to make sense of the chaos that a separation
of such a partnership creates.153 While applying the principles of
partnership and equitable distribution are necessary when a marriage ends,154 the application of these principles to the marriage itself
is less appropriate.
The partnership theory of marriage casts onto all married couples
one belief: two individuals are united as one financial entity. 155 However, some couples choose to join their lives without joining their re148. See 668 So. 2d at 179 (Overton, J., dissenting).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 178; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1991)
(holding that the court should consider goodwill accumulated during a marriage as a
marital asset); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203-04 (Fla. 1980).
151. See Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1791-94. But see Borja, supra note 17,
at 429-35.
152. See Connor, 668 So. 2d at 178-79, (citing Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203-04;
Thompson, 576 So. 2d at 268).
153. See Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204 (stating that a trial court must ensure that
neither spouse passes automatically from misfortune to prosperity or from prosperity to
misfortune, and, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, one spouse should not be
“shortchanged.”).
154. See Thompson, 576 So. 2d at 270; Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204. The Thompson
court quoted Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), for the
proposition that it would be inequitable to ignore goodwill attributable to a spouse if in
fact it exists. See 576 So. 2d at 270 (quoting Prahinski, 540 A.2d at 841).
155. See Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1105
(N.J. 1980) (stating that marriage is a partnership and that in most marriages, a husband
and wife consider themselves a financial unit); Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at
1793 (stating that the partnership theory of marriage is superficially tempting because
most spouses, like business partners, pool their assets); see also Judith Treas, Money in
the Bank: Transaction Costs and the Economic Organization of Marriage, 58 AM. SOC.
REV. 723, 723 (1993) (stating that Americans expect married couples to pool their income
and assets and discussing a study in which 69% of wives and 75% of husbands favored
pooling when asked whether spouses should combine all their income and assets).
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sources.156 Some spouses enter into premarital agreements to protect
assets each brings into the marriage and maintain separate bank accounts and credit cards.157 This arrangement is not yet the norm, but
the trend illustrates a changing society upon which neither the legislature nor the judiciary should cast antiquated beliefs. The unity
theory of marriage that prevailed a century ago and a doctrine of
necessaries that required no reciprocal duty for a woman to support
a man seem absurd and outdated now.158 How long is it before a
partnership theory of marriage no longer fits the needs of modern
society?
Allowing the law to interfere with the marriage itself—to dictate
that an individual can no longer contract as an individual but rather
only as an entity—goes far beyond the state's interest in promoting
marital support.159 The doctrine of necessaries undermines the rights
of the individual because it attaches liability to one individual for the
debts of another. Mrs. Harris had a reason for refusing to guarantee
her husband’s medical expenses, although we can only speculate as
to what that reason was.160 When courts or lawmakers interfere with
156. See Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1795-97:
Superficially, the interest that married people have in apportioning support
obligations for themselves may seem to be simply an economic one. The implications of this decision, however, transcend family economics. The choice of
support obligations affects the emotional character of the marital relationship
and the internal power structure of the family.
157. See Treas, supra note 155, at 723. Treas states:
Despite general support for common ownership, some married individuals hold
money back from the common pot as demonstrated by studies of British
working class couples, of readers of an American women’s magazine, and of
dual career couples in Chicago. In extreme cases, all money is segregated and
common expenditures are met according to an agreed upon formula or end-ofthe-month bargaining. Separate accounting systems are apparently on the
rise-the proportion of married women with checking or savings accounts in
their own names nearly doubled between 1972 and 1980.
Id. (emphasis added).
158. Very few courts deny that the original common-law doctrine of necessaries has no
place in modern society. As the court in Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald
stated, “Changing times demand reexamination of seemingly unchangeable legal dogma.
Equality under law and even handed treatment of the sexes in the modern market place
must also carry the burden of responsibility which goes with the benefits.” 392 So. 2d
1356, 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
159. With respect to the state’s interest in promoting stable marriages, one commentator writes:
Spousal support obligations, it is argued, benefit spouses and society by encouraging sharing and mutual support in marriage. This behavior is thought
to foster individual contentment which in turn promotes social harmony. The
problem with applying this reasoning to the necessaries doctrine is that law
cannot coerce these benefits; sharing produces cooperation and happiness only
when it is voluntary. The necessaries doctrine forces sharing on reluctant partners and thus seems unlikely to promote the State’s goal of marital happiness.
Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1795 (footnotes omitted).
160. See North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471, 472 (N.C.
1987); see also supra text accompanying notes 101-02.

1048

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1031

a spouse’s decision by allowing the doctrine of necessaries to stand,
they succumb to a paternalistic attitude that ignores a basic principle: One can decide when and how one will contract for liability and
whose debts one will guarantee.161
Furthermore, Florida is not a community property state. Therefore, marital property is owned separately, and neither spouse has a
legal interest in the assets or income of the other. This fact further
undermines the analogy between marriage and business partnerships. The doctrine of necessaries in effect leads to a system of community property by imposing liability for each spouse’s debts on the
other.162 As such, neither form of the doctrine of necessaries—joint
and several liability or primary and secondary liability—is an adequate alternative.
Finally, Justice Overton argued that “in many households, both
spouses are employed but only one spouse provides the medical coverage for the entire household. Under these circumstances, the extension of the doctrine fits like a glove by requiring the more able
spouse to care for the needs of the household.” 163 If both spouses are
earning wages that could be contributed to potential medical expenses, one can only assume Justice Overton is referring to health
care insurance that may be a benefit of one spouse’s job and not the
other. However, doctrine-of-necessaries cases that involve any mention of insurance disputes are practically nonexistent. 164 Therefore,
Justice Overton’s example is inapt because the necessaries doctrine
is generally utilized only in cases in which an individual is indebted
to a health care provider outright.165
D. Primary Liability on the Husband
The Wisconsin Supreme Court extended the doctrine to place
primary liability on the husband and secondary liability on the wife,
regardless of who incurred the debt.166 The court found that joint and
several liability was not an appropriate alternative because, statisti161. The controversy surrounding the doctrine of necessaries is evidence of the courts’
reluctance to create an exception to this principle.
162. See Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1792. To ensure that a spouse’s separate property may be applied to debts for necessaries incurred by the other spouse, some
community property states have statutes expressly codifying the doctrine to impose joint
and several liability. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 94 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.090
(1995).
163. Connor, 668 So. 2d at 179.
164. One of the few doctrine-of-necessaries cases that involves an insurance dispute,
Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983), is discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 110-19.
165. See, e.g., Connor, 668 So. 2d at 175; St. Francis Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles,
836 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Kan. 1992); Harris, 354 S.E.2d at 471.
166. See Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 299 N.W.2d
226, 230 (Wis. 1980).
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cally, the majority of married women were not the primary wage
earners in their respective families and were partially dependent on
their husbands.167
This modification did not present a gender-neutral solution, however, and the equal protection issue came before the Wisconsin Supreme Court two years later in Marshfield Clinic v. Discher.168 In
that case, the court cited several United States Supreme Court cases
that held that a gender-based rule does not violate the Equal Protection Clause if it serves important governmental objectives and the
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.169 In light of these cases, the court upheld the doctrine it had modified earlier, stating that imposing primary liability
on the husband serves several important goals:
The rule benefits families by making it more likely that they will
obtain necessary and appropriate goods and services. It enables
wives to obtain credit more easily, rather than having to depend on
their husbands to make necessary purchases. It also protects wives
from economic hardship by placing primary liability on husbands.
This is significant because . . . wives have made substantial economic gains in the past decade, but substantial economic disparities still persist between husbands and wives.170

At the same time, the court recognized the rule would become outmoded in a society in which women are equal with men on an income-producing level. The court stated:
In the future it may be that wives will achieve greater equality
with their husbands in terms of their relative financial strength. If
that occurs then this rule may need to be modified, but for the present it is well suited to the relative economic status of the typical
husband and wife.171

Marshfield was decided in 1982, and the necessaries doctrine has not
been modified further by the Wisconsin Legislature.
E. The Equal Protection Problem Persists
It is generally agreed that placing primary liability on the husband is a poor solution because it does little to correct any disparities
between the sexes.172 It is not a gender-neutral alternative and is
167. See id. at 230-31.
168. 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982).
169. See id. at 328 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 331.
172. See Mark S. Brennan, Comment, The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia, 19
U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 328-29 (1985); Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1777-78.
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still subject to constitutional attack.173 At least one commentator argues that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was simply
wrong.174 Furthermore, although extending the doctrine in this way
may take statistics into account, it panders to a view of wives as dependent and inferior and thus perpetuates a stereotype that a forward-looking judiciary or legislature should seek to avoid. 175 The
minimal protection such a rule affords women does not outweigh the
societal harm it may cause to the gender.
F. Abrogation of the Doctrine
Four states abolished the doctrine of necessaries before Florida. 176
The high courts in three of these states concluded that extending the
necessaries doctrine represented a fundamental change in policy
with broad social implications, and was therefore a decision better
left to the legislature.177 The Florida Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion in Connor and explicitly stated, “We do not make a
judgment as to which is the better policy for the state to adopt.” 178
The Mississippi Supreme Court is the only court to make a definite
comment on the wisdom of its decision and not implore legislators to
rectify the problem.179 However, the court’s explanation was brief,
stating:
Nothing in our jurisprudence obligates one spouse to be liable to a
third party for the debts of the other without express consent. To
hold otherwise would violate art. 4, § 94 of the Mississippi Constitution and open the door for either spouse to control or deplete the
other’s separate estate.180
173. See Brennan, supra note 172, at 329.
174. Arguing that Wisconsin’s necessaries rule remains unconstitutional under Orr. v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the commentator observes:
Using an intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court held that although the legislative purpose—help for “needy spouses”—was an important governmental
objective, there was no justification for using sex as a proxy for need when individualized hearings to ascertain need were already part of the procedure for
awarding alimony. Similarly, the Wisconsin and traditional necessaries rules
have aid for needy spouses as their primary purpose and require individual
hearings to determine liability. By analogy to Orr, this use of sex as a proxy for
need appears to be unconstitutional.
Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1777 (footnotes omitted).
175. See Brennan, supra note 172, at 329.
176. See Govan v. Medical Credit Servs., Inc., 621 So. 2d 928, 931 (Miss. 1993);
Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578, 580 (Ala. 1992); Condore v. Prince George’s County,
425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d
905, 908 (Va. 1983).
177. See Emanuel, 596 So. 2d at 580; Condore, 425 A.2d at 1019; Schilling, 303 S.E.2d
at 908.
178. 668 So. 2d at 177.
179. Govan, 621 So. 2d at 931.
180. Id. at 931.
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The Mississippi Legislature has allowed the supreme court’s decision
to stand.
1. The Response of Other Legislatures
Presently, only one legislature has accepted a court’s challenge to
codify some form of the doctrine of necessaries. 181 One year after the
Virginia Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine,182 the Virginia Legislature responded by amending the chapter entitled “Property Rights of
Married Women.”183 The statute provides: “The doctrine of necessaries
as it existed at common-law shall apply equally to both spouses, except
where they are permanently living separate and apart . . . .”184 However, the statute does not specify whether the courts should apply joint
and several liability or primary and secondary liability.
2. The Effect of Abrogation
Creditors unable to collect from wealthy spouses may find abrogation a harsh policy.185 Creditors that provide goods or services to a financially dependent spouse cannot collect the debt from the financially independent spouse and may remain unpaid. However, most
creditors ask for a guarantor before services are provided as a means
to protect themselves from this outcome.186 Judging from the small
number of doctrine-of-necessaries cases in Florida, most creditors
have little difficulty obtaining the guarantee of the other spouse.
Most spouses would seem to have little problem signing an express
contract for necessary medical services provided to their husbands or
wives. Even if a spouse were aware that his or her refusal to guarantee would free that spouse from individual financial responsibility,
most would not choose this tactic for fear that their failure to sign
might jeopardize the other spouse’s chances of obtaining treatment.
By allowing spouses to cover their individual debts, abrogation of the
doctrine permits those spouses who have a reason to refuse or who
maintain separate finances to structure their marriage and finances
as they choose, rather than structure them upon the philosophy of
the legislature or the judiciary.187
181. Other states have codified some form of the doctrine or created family expense
statutes without prompting by a court. See supra notes 68, 74, 124 and accompanying text.
182. See Schilling, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
183. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-37 to -47 (Michie 1996).
184. Id. § 55-37.
185. See Brennan, supra note 172, at 329-30 (arguing that such a modification of the
doctrine would leave creditors no recourse to collect debts).
186. See Unnecessary Doctrine, supra note 3, at 1791 (arguing that creditors do not
need the protection the necessaries doctrine affords them because creditors can protect
themselves through their own actions).
187. See id. at 1795-97.
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Because the state cannot know what financial structure is best for
an individual family, it has been suggested that an unenforceable
support duty should be enacted to promote the stability of families. 188
A symbolic law would allow the state to encourage marital support
without legally interfering in a couple’s financial decisions. 189 Even
this, however, seems unnecessary because married couples will continue to share expenses and support one another out of love and tradition, regardless of any input from the state. “No one contends that
the threat of liability under the doctrine of necessaries motivates
spouses to provide for one another. Surely only a very few spouses
know that it exists.”190
IV. CONCLUSION
While abrogation of the necessaries doctrine may seem a harsh
result to creditors and an unromantic view of spousal support, it affords more respect to the rights of married individuals than the alternatives. First, imposing joint and several liability provides far
more protection to creditors than to families. It allows creditors complete discretion when collecting a debt because liability attaches to
either spouse, no matter which spouse incurred the expenses. Likewise, imposing primary liability on the spouse who incurred the debt
is an inadequate alternative because it relies too heavily on the
partnership theory of marriage, a theory that ignores the autonomy
of the individual and family in allocating financial resources. Lastly,
imposing primary liability on the husband is also inappropriate because it ignores the equal protection issue created by a gender-based
rule.
The Florida Supreme Court was correct in its assertion that a
lack of consensus existed regarding the doctrine of necessaries. Although the court stated that its decision was not a comment on
which policy the state should adopt, the Florida Legislature should
consider abrogation to be the best alternative and refuse to codify
any form of the doctrine. While Florida’s decision to abrogate may
place it in the minority, the Florida Legislature would not be alone
in refusing to codify the doctrine. Furthermore, those states that
have reaffirmed or codified the doctrine in its original form should
188. See id. at 1798.
189. See id.:
People obey symbolic laws not for fear of legal sanction, but because they are
backed by the consensus of society and the force of major social institutions.
This symbolic or instructional effect of law is probably strongest in areas of
traditional morality . . . . According to this system of analysis, legal endorsement of spousal support has a real, if unmeasurable, impact on spousal behavior.
190. Id.
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follow Florida’s lead by abolishing this outdated and unnecessary
law. No form of the doctrine, whether it imposes joint and several liability, primary liability on the spouse who incurred the debt, or
primary liability on the husband, is an acceptable alternative in a
rapidly changing society in which families should be free to merge or
separate their financial resources as they deem fit.

